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Trial Practice and Procedure
by Stevan A. Miller*
and
Kristen K. Duggan**

This Article surveys the 1992 decisions of the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals that have significant impact upon the area of trial practice and
procedure.
I.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Consent Order

A.

In England v. Kemp,' the Eleventh Circuit determined that a federal
district court has the power to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over
the claims of a class member seeking relief under a consent order that
had earlier settled a sex discrimination class action.2 Because plaintiff was
pursuing, recovery under a consent order, she was not required to first
exhaust her administrative remedies.3 The court also determined that
even though plaintiff England was not a named party to the consent order, she was in fact a member of the class of plaintiffs who had settled
the claim, and was thus entitled to enforce the agreement." Furthermore,
even though England's claim was based on the obligations contained in
the consent decree, the dismissal of the class action did not operate to bar
* Partner in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Virginia
(B.A., with high distinction, 1974; J.D., 1977). Member, Atlanta Bar Association, American
Bar Association, Defense Research Institute, Georgia Defense Lawyers Association, Atlanta
Claims Association.
** Associate in the firm of Drew, EckI & Farnham, Atlanta, Georgia. Furman University
(B.A., 1986); Georgia State University (J.D., 1991). Member, State Bar of Georgia, Atlanta
Bar Association, American Bar Association.
1. 976 F.2d 662 (11th Cir. 1992).

2. Id. at 665.
3.
4.

Id. at 664.
Id. at 665.
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the lawsuit based on the consent order.6 Dismissal of the earlier lawsuit
did not imply that defendant, the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), had in fact completely complied with the order, but
merely meant that defendant's reported efforts to comply were sufficient.
Therefore, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction
to entertain
7
plaintiff's claim that the order was being violated.
B.

Confidentiality Order
In Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,s the court dealt with the pro-

posed modification of a confidentiality order.' Frank Home, not a party
to the case, filed a motion to modify a confidentiality order sealing the
terms of a settlement. Home had sued his former partner, Jones' attorney, in state court seeking a portion of the attorney fees recovered in the
federal court case. The district court held that Home's motion was premature, as the state court action was still pending.10 The court of appeals
determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal
from this decision for three reasons: (1), the trial court's order was not a
final order for the purpose of appellate jurisdiction, (2) the ruling is not
the sort of order contemplated by, the "collateral order doctrine"' ' as the
district court's order did not conclusively determine the disputed question, and finally, (3) the trial court's order was not subject to a discretionary interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)"8 because the Notice
1
of Appeal was filed more than ten days after the entry of the order. 3
C. DeclaratoryJudgment Action
In Hudson Insurance Co. v. American Electric Corp.," the Eleventh

Circuit refused to allow federal question jurisdiction over an insurance
coverage claim arising out of an environmental problem concerning the
federal "Superfund" law, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA").15 The insurer
brought a declaratory judgment action in federal court to determine its
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.

Id.
Id.
967 F.2d 514 (llth Cir. 1992).
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id. at 515-16. The collateral order doctrine is a judicially created exception to 28

U.S.C. § 1291 (1988).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988).
13. 967 F.2d at 516.
14. 957 F.2d 826 (11th Cir,), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 411 (1992).

15. 957 F.2d at 831; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988).
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liability to its insureds for costs in cleaning up hazardous substances
found on one of the insured's disposal sites. The district court dismissed
the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1 s The insurance carrier
argued that because CERCLA created the liability for which the insured
was seeking reimbursement, federal question jurisdiction existed for the
related insurance coverage dispute. 17 However, the Eleventh Circuit
agreed with the trial court."8 Citing to the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Avco
Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735,19 a decision recognizing the preemptive
force of the Labor Management Relations Act to displace any state cause
of action, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that "there is no parallel federal
cause of action for the recovery of insurance proceeds for CERCLA-created liability."20 Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit found that
no claim specifically arose out of CERCLA's jurisdictional provision,"1
and held that a claim for insurance proceeds to pay CERCLA obligations
is a state cause of action, and not a matter creating federal subject matter
jurisdiction.2
D. Remand
23
The decision in Harris v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc.

presents an interesting analysis on the limitations existing both on a trial
court and a federal appellate court in dealing with the remand of a case
to state court. In general, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) provides that an order remahding a case to state court is "... not reviewable on appeal or otherwise . . .," except in civil rights cases removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1443.24 Appellant Harris argued that review was appropriate because
her federal claim" had been dismissed on the merits, and that this was
the basis of the remand.2 Harris tried to fit within the "substantive law"
exception to the rule against review, arguing that only remand orders
based on jurisdictional grounds are immune from review, not orders based
on substantive rulings.2 The Eleventh Circuit found that the dismissal of
16. 957 F.2d at. 828.
17. Id. at 829.
18. Id. at 831.
19. 376 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
20. 957 F.2d at 830.
21. Id. at 831.
22. Id.
23. 951 F.2d 325 (lth Cir. 1992).
24. Id. at 326.
25. The federal claim was based on improper notification of her lapse in health insurance under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA").
26. 951 F.2d at 328.
27. Id. at 329. See Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976), for a
discussion of this "substantive law" exception.
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appellant's federal cause of action was jurisdictionally based, not based
on the merits.2 Significantly, the Eleventh Circuit went on to hold that
just as it had no jurisdiction to review the remand, neither did the trial
court. The trial court had changed its remand ruling, reasserted jurisdiction, and then ruled on defendant's summary judgment motion.2 9 The
court in Harris held, however, that this was improper because the district
court also had no right to review its own remand order.3 0
E. Collateral Order Doctrine
In Forbus v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,"1 the Eleventh Circuit decided
whether it had jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal under the "collateral order doctrine."8 2 Suit was brought by former employees of Sears
who were induced into early retirement and who, upon retirement, executed releases that Sears claimed were a bar to any suit against Sears.
The retirees sought to assert state law claims, as well as claims under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 83 Based on the releases, the court denied summary judgment to Sears. 4 As a general rule,
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, interlocutory orders are not appealable.8 8 However, Sears successfully argued that under the "collateral order doctrine"
its appeal was proper .3s The collateral order doctrine is applicable only if
the order being reviewed meets three criteria: (1) "'filt must conclusively
determine the disputed question,'" (2) "'resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action,'" and (3) "'be effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.' ",87 The Eleventh Circuit
cited to opinions in the Fifth Circuit s and Second Circuit 9 applying this
doctrine to interlocutory orders denying enforcement of a release agreement, and denying a defendant's motion to enforce a settlement agree28. 951 F.2d at 330.
29. id. For a similar decision, see Bregman v. Alderman, 955 F.2d 660 (11th Cir. 1992)
(remand for failure to plead citizenship is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction and is not
reviewable).
30. 951 F.2d at 330.
31. 958 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 412 (1992).
32. 958 F.2d at 1039.
33. Id. at 1038; 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1985).
34. 958 F.2d at 1038.
35. Id. at 1039.

36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 431 (1985)).
38. Id. (citing Grillet v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1991)) (jurisdiction
to review a denial of summary judgment that effectively denied enforcement of a release
agreement).
39. Id. (citing Janneh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
177 (1990)) (jurisdiction to review denial of motion to enforce settlement agreement).
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ment. Following this rationale, the Eleventh Circuit held that the collateral order doctrine should be applied to an interlocutory order denying
enforcement of an agreement to forego litigation. 0 Since the case met this
three-pronged test, the court determined that it had jurisdiction over the
appeal. 1
F. Removal by Foreign State
The court in In re Surinam Airways Holding Co.42 clarified subject
matter jurisdiction in cases removed by foreign states. Surinam Airways,
partially owned by the country of Surinam, was brought into a state court
action as a third party defendant and sought removal of the entire case to
federal court. The district court determined, however, that it had jurisdiction only over the claims against the airline, and remanded the remainder
of the case to state court."s Recognizing that a district court in New
York" agreed with the trial court's approach, the Eleventh Circuit determined that a removal concerning a foreign state encompasses removal of
the entire case, "both third-party claim's and the plaintiffs' claims, to federal district court."'' The court relied on an analysis of pendant jurisdiction in a Fifth Circuit' 6 opinion, the legislative history behind 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(d) that authorizes removal by foreign states, and the "importance
of developing a uniform body of law"' 7 in dealing with foreign nations.48
Therefore, removal of an action by a foreign country is appropriate and
effectively takes all federal and pendant state claims to federal court. 9
II.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

The Eleventh Circuit decided two important decisions regarding personal jurisdiction in 1992. The court in Olivier v. Merritt Dredging Co.,50
a case of first impression, held that a state insurance guaranty fund can
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at 1039-40.
974 F.2d 1255 (11th Cir. 1992).

43. Id. at 1256-58.
44. Alifieris v. American Airlines, Inc., 523"F. Supp. 1189, 1192 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (allowed
removal of only the third party claims).
45. 974 F.2d at 1260.
46. Id.; Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1587
(1991).
47. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1978).
48. 974 F.2d at 1259.
49.. Id. at 1260-61.
50. 979 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1992) (an opinion was originally issued in March 1992 at 954
F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1992), but was withdrawn and reissued December 21, 1992).
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be sued in a state other than where it operates.' Mr. Olivier, a Louisiana
resident, was employed by a South Carolina company and was injured
while working in Alabama.82 The Louisiana resident received a judgment
against his South Carolina employer, Merritt Dredging Company."
Shortly following the judgment, Merritt went bankrupt 4 and Merritt's
insurer, Midland Insurance Company, entered liquidation." Due to the
insolvency of the insurance company, Olivier requested that the district
court in Alabama issue writs of garnishment to the Louisiana Insurance
Guaranty Association ("LIGA"), the South Carolina Insurance Guaranty
Association ("SCIGA"), and the Alabama Insurance Guaranty Association ("AIGA"), each of which are unincorporated associations created
under state statute." LIGA and SCIGA asserted that they were not subject to personal jurisdiction in Alabama, and the district court agreed. 7
Deciding an issue not addressed by any federal appellate court, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the Alabama long arm statute extends its
jurisdiction over both out-of-state associations."
Under Alabama's long arm statute, the district court can exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident if it determines that (1) a defendant has minimum contacts with Alabama, and (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
While the test itself is not new, application to this fact situation is new.
The court found that both associations have sufficient minimum contacts
by virtue of guaranteeing the payment of Midland's policy for claimants
who are Alabama residents or for insureds who are Alabama residents."
The Eleventh Circuit did not hold LIGA and SCIGA subject to legal liability in Alabama based on the "random contacts" or "unilateral activity"
of Midland Insurance." Instead, the court reasoned that the state associations were formed to avoid federal legislation to create a national
fund; therefore, "the insurance industry had to anticipate that the guaranty associations would be haled into the same courts where their insolvent members would have been subject." 2 The court also determined
that the insurance associations met the second prong of the test because
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

834.
829.

834.
830-31.
832.
833.
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the assertion of personal jurisdiction would not substantially burden either association. 3 On the contrary, the court reasoned that it would be
unduly burdensome to require Mr. Olivier to seek coverage for his claim
from both Louisiana courts and South Carolina courts because it would
frustrate the very purpose of the state insurance guaranty associations.'
In another interesting personal jurisdiction case, Vermeulen v. Renault
U.S.A., Inc.,6 the Eleventh Circuit applied the Georgia long arm statute
in a product liability action involving a foreign car manufacturer. 6 oThe
Eleventh Circuit determined that Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault
("Renault") had sufficient contacts with Georgia to be subject to long arm
jurisdiction in a case of an alleged design defect in a Renault car. 7 The
French manufacturer had entered into a marketing agreement with a
United States corporation and, through this agreement, retained input
into certain marketing decisions, such as price." Noting some disparity in
the Georgia cases interpreting the long arm statute,6 9 the Eleventh Circuit concluded that,the Supreme Court of Georgia desires to expand long
arm jurisdiction to the limits of the due process clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution." While one Georgia Supreme Court case, Gust v. Flint,'1 seemingly departs from this rule, the
Eleventh Circuit chose to follow other decisions of the Georgia Supreme
Court that expansively apply the long arm statute.72 Therefore, it applied
a broad constitutional due process approach to determine whether personal jurisdiction could be asserted against Renault.' 3
In Vermeulen the Eleventh Circuit gives a good overview of the unsettled law of personal jurisdiction in "stream of commerce cases.""17 The
most stringent requirements for jurisdiction in these cases have been
enunciated in the United States Supreme Court's plurality decision in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano
County,"5 characterized as "the stream of commerce plus" test. Under
this test, it is not enough that a product ends up in the forum state
through the stream of commerce, but it is also necessary that the defend63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 834.
Id.
975 F.2d 746 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 147.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 762.
Id. at 748.
Id. at 754 n.14.
Id.
257 Ga. 129, 356 S.E.2d 513 (1987).
975 F.2d at 754 n.14.
Id.
Id. at 754-56.
480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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ant purposely availed itself of the market of that forum state.7 Without
deciding if this is the proper test or not, the Eleventh Circuit found that
Renault's conduct met the "stream of commerce plus" test, and therefore
made it unnecessary for the court to pick between this test and a more
relaxed standard.7 Finding that Renault designed its products for the
American market, advertised its products in the forum state, and established channels for providing regular advice to customers in Georgia, the
court concluded that Renault had purposely availed itself of the Georgia
market. 8
III. PLEADING

A. Amended Complaint
In Abramson v. Gonzalez,"' the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district
court's denial of plaintiff's request to file a seventh amended complaint in
a constitutional case challenging the licensing of psychologists in Florida. 0 The original complaint had been filed in 1981. A motion for permission to file a seventh amended complaint was filed on November 1,
1989.81 The seventh amended complaint alleged that the challenged Florida statutes were inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, the
Sherman Antitrust Act." In earlier complaints, plaintiff had presented
antitrust claims, which the district court dismissed as meritless, and even
awarded attorney fees to the defendants on those counts.'" The Eleventh
Circuit determined that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the proposed amendment when the case had dragged on for over
nine years, the proposed amendment contained a new cause of action unlike those that remained in the sixth amended complaint, the proposed
amendment was apparently futile, and the case was set for trial in a
month.'4 In denying plaintiff's motion to amend, the district court did not
articulate its reasons. However, the Eleventh Circuit held that although
no reasons were articulated, there was "no need to remand where the reasons are many and obvious as here.""5
76. 975 F.2d at 755 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano
County, 480 U.S. 102, 110 (1987)).
77. Id. at 756-57.
78. Id, at 758-60.
79. 949 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992).
80. Id. at 1582.
81. Id. at 1571, 1581.
82. Id.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
83. 949 F.2d at 1581.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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B. Defenses
In Wallace v. Dunn ConstructionCo.," the Eleventh Circuit refused to
recognize evidence of an employee's fraud, discovered after the employee
was fired, as a defense to the alleged wrongful termination.87 After being
fired, plaintiff brought suit against her employer under the Equal Pay
Act" and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196409 alleging inadequate
compensation, retaliatory discharge, and sexual harassment, as well as
two pendant state law claims for invasion of privacy and assault and battery.' 0 While litigating the case, her employer discovered that she had
pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and marijuana prior to filing her
application for employment, and had therefore lied on her employment
application. 1 In a case of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit, the
court analyzed the Tenth Circuit's approach to such "after acquired evidence" in the case of Summers." In Summers the employer discovered
during preparation for trial, almost four years after the termination of
Summers, that Summers had falsified 150 different records.93 The Tenth
Circuit held that after-acquired evidence barred the existence of liability
as a practicalmatter, and thus provided the employer with the equivalent
of an affirmative defense." The Eleventh Circuit in Wallace, however,
rejected the Summers rule that after-acquired evidence provides "an affirmative defense to Title VII liability" or to any of plaintiff's other federal claims under the Equal Pay Act." The Eleventh Circuit held that the
effect of such evidence should be determined on a case by case basis." In
Wallace such evidence did not rise to the level of an affirmative defense,
but rather was evidence that would affect plaintiff's recovery. 7 The court
reasoned that while the plaintiff was not free from bad conduct, when
that conduct had nothing to do with the reasons behind the termination,
or alleged discriminatory practice, it should not be used as an affirmative
defense barring any recovery."
86. 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992).
87. Id. at 1189.

88. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 & Supp. 1990).
90. 968 F.2d at 1176.
91. Id. at 1176-77.
92. Id. at 1178; Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir.
1988).
93.

864 F.2d at 702-03.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 709.
968 F.2d at 1181.
Id.
Id. at 1184.
Id. at 1181-84.
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C. Proceeding Under Fictitious Name
In another interesting case, Doe v. Frank," the Eleventh Circuit determined that a plaintiff's problem with alcoholism did not give rise to an
,exception to Rule 10(a)100 pleading requirements.1 0' Plaintiff Doe alleged
retaliatory discharge from the United States Postal Service due to his alcoholism and pursued his case under a fictitious name.102 Rule 10(a) requires a plaintiff to include the names of all parties in a complaint.103 The
court found that neither personal embarrassment nor that the suit was
against the federal government would warrant anonymity and overcome
the presumption of public court proceedings.'04
IV. ISSUES AT TRIAL
A.

Statute of Limitations

In United States v. Moore, the court held that a federal statute of
limitations applies to Small Business Administration's ("SBA") claims for
fraudulent conveyance against the loan guarantor on a promissory note.'"
The SBA loaned money to Cello-Therm.' 07 Mr. Moore, a principal owner
of Cello-Therm, was guarantor of the loan Over a six year period, Moore
transferred all of his personal property for little or no consideration to his
wife, two sons, and a closely held corporation. In a suit to recover on the
loan, the district court found that all but one of Moore's property transfers were fraudulent conveyances, and therefore void.10 8 Moore appealed,
claiming that the district court applied the wrong statute of limitations.10'
-The state statute of limitations for fraudulent conveyances had expired
by the time the SBA filed suit.'10 The Eleventh Circuit found that the
money was made available to Cello-Therm pursuant to federal statutes
providing for guaranteed loans to qualifying small businesses. 1 ' Recog99,

951 F.2d 320 (l1th Cir. 1992).
FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
101. Id.

100.

102. 951 F.2d at 322.
103. See FED. R. Civ, P. 10(a) ("In the Complaint the title of the action shall include the
names of all the parties.").
104. 951 F.2d at 324.
105. 968 F.2d 1099 (11th Cir. 1992).
106. Id. at 1101.
107. Id. at 1099. Moore and two other principal owners of Cello-Therm had personally
guaranteed payment of Cello-Therm's promissory note. Id. at 1099-1100.
108. Id. at 1100.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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nizing that it was well settled law that the United States is not bound by
state statutes of limitation,' the court adopted the Ninth Circuit's analysis of this issue.1 8 In United States v. Neidorf,"' the Ninth Circuit
found that even if fraudulent conveyance actions were generally governed
by state law, when brought by the United States, the statute of limitations must be determined by reference to the federal statute of limitations."' Because the SBA guaranteed a portion of the loan, and the
money was made available to Cello-Therm through the SBA, the federal
statute of limitations was applicable."1 0
B. Privilege Law
In Hancock v. Hobbs, 17 the Eleventh Circuit held that federal privilege
law governs cases premised on federal question jurisdiction, even when
pendant state law claims are affected by the privilege issue." 8 In Hancock
an arrestee brought an action against a police officer and her employer
alleging an arrest without probable cause, the use of excessive force, and
battery." ' During trial, the district court admitted evidence to the jury of
the arrestee's past psychiatric treatment.,20 Georgia law precludes the
submission of this evidence to the jury.''
A claim of privilege in federal court is resolved by federal common law
unless the action is a civil proceeding, and the privilege is invoked "'with
respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision . '. .' "'2 Federal common law does not recognize a
psychiatrist/patient privilege. However, Hancock also involved pendant
state law counts.'"2 Noting that Federal Rule of Evidence 501 is not clear
about the rule to follow when federal and state laws about privilege are in
conflict, the court noted that other courts confronting this issue in the
context of discovery' 24 have uniformly found that the federal law of privilege governs even when the evidence sought might be relevant to a pen112. Id.
113. Id. at 1100-01.
114. 522 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976).
115. 522 F.2d at 920.
116. 968 F.2d at 1101.
117. 967 F.2d 462 (11th Cir. 1992).
118. Id. at 467.
119. Id. at 464.
120. Id. at 466.
121. Id. See id. at 466 n.6 (O.C.G.A. § 24-9-21(5) (1982) (excludes psychiatrist/patient
communications from evidence)).
122. 967 F.2d at 466 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 501).

123. Id.
124. See, e.g., von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1987); Win. T. Thompson
Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1982).
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dant state claim. 1 5 The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the federal law
of privilege provides the rule of decision in a civil proceeding when the
court's jurisdiction is premised upon a federal question, even if the evidence is also relevant to a pendant state law claim that would be subject
to a different law of privilege in state court."' "Not only are rules of privilege generally looked upon with disfavor by the federal courts . . ., it
also would be impractical to apply two different rules of privilege to the
7
same evidence before a single jury.""11
C. Reservation of Federal Issues
Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Authority""' illustrates a trap to
avoid when forced to first litigate a matter concerning federal questions
in state court. Several homeowners sued an airport authority in Florida
for inverse condemnation related to overflights.2 Suit had to be filed
first in state court before filing in federal court to satisfy a requirement
that state remedies be exhausted."30 To avoid a res judicata problem with
'not raising federal takings claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments in the state court action, the Eleventh Circuit has held in
the past that a party can reserve constitutional claims for subsequent litigation in federal court by "making on the state record a reservation to the
disposition of the entire case by the state courts," a so-called Jennings
reservation."' Plaintiffs did not raise any Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment takings arguments in the state court proceedings and subsequently
filed suit in federal court."'3 While recognizing that plaintiffs were "involuntarily" in state court,"' the court held that the recognized exception to
res judicata principles exists, if, and only if, plaintiffs make a formal reservation 3 4 in state court of their intent to later resolve constitutional
claims in federal court.1"' The plaintiffs in Fields failed to make an ade125. 967 F.2d at 466.
126. Id. at 467.
127. Id.
128. 953 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1992).
129. Id. at 1302.
130. See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
131. Jennings v. Caddo Parrish Sch. Bd., 531 F.2d 1331, 1332 (5th Cir.), eert. denied, 429
U.S. 897 (1976).
132. 953 F.2d at 1308-09.
133, Id. at 1306.

134. Id.
135. The court refers to this reservation as the "Jennings Reservation" after the case of
Jennings v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 531 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897
(1976) (a litigant may reserve constitutional claims for federal court by making a record of
intent in the state court action).
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quate reservation, and the Eleventh Circuit held that "[a]ttempting to
silently reserve federal issues by failing to raise them in a state court
to preserve federal court review of uncomplaint is clearly insufficient
' 6
raised constitutional issues.'

1

D. Amended Statutes
In Henderson v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,'3 7 the Eleventh Circuit
adopted the Fourth Circuit's approach in Howard v.Haddad,"' and refused to remand a case to the district court where a controlling statute
was amended after the appeal. While the appeal was pending in a securities fraud class action case, Congress enacted the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and affecting the rights of the parties.18 9 The court
declined to remand the case to the district court to consider the effect of
the amendment because the sole issue was one of law, and did not require
additional fact finding.140 Furthermore, the court determined that both
parties had the opportunity in their appellate
briefs and oral arguments
41
to discuss the effects of the amendment.
V.

JUDGMENTS

A. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
In Network Publications,Inc. v. Ellis Graphics Corp.,"'' the court explained the options available to trial courts in granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") or, alternatively, a motion for new
trial." 8 In a breach of warranty case concerning the sale of two machines,
the district court granted Ellis Graphics' motion for JNOV to the jury's
award of damages to Network, based on Network's failure "to introduce
'any evidence on which the jury could have reasonably calculated either
compensatory or consequential damages.' "" In a lengthy discussion of a,
trial court's discretionary power under Rule 50(b)'4 5 to grant either a
JNOV or, in the alternative, a new trial, the court emphasized that either
option is a possibility when the defect in plaintiff's evidence may be rem136. 953 F.2d at 1306, 1309.
137. 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992).
138. 962 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1992).,
139.
140.
141.

971 F.2d at 1570.
Id.
Id.

142. 959 F.2d 212 (11th Cir. 1992).
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 213.
Id.
FFD. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
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edied in a new trial." Noting that an appellate court has the authority to
order a new trial even when the trial court grants a JNOV, the Eleventh
Circuit held that a new trial was appropriate in this case.' 47 Because the
trial court had not addressed the liability finding, seemingly leaving it
intact, and because plaintiff had established some evidence of damages,
the court ordered a new trial, even though plaintiff,
on appeal, had simply
1
"
verdict.
jury
its
of
reinstatement.
for
asked
B. Motion to Dismiss
In Green v. Hill,1" the court considered what standard a trial court
should apply in resolving a subject matter jurisdiction question when it is
intertwined with the merits of a plaintiff's claim. 150 Plaintiff alleged,
among other things, an assault and battery by his supervisor. 's1 If this
occurred within the supervisor's scope of employment, then the case
should be dismissed because the claim would be preempted by the exclusive remedies in the Federal Employees' Compensation Act.s' If not work
related, the claim could proceed forward. The Eleventh Circuit concluded
that when the jurisdictional basis of a claim is intertwined with an element of the cause of action, an attack on jurisdiction is indirectly an attack on the merits of the case, and therefore should be judged under the
Rule 56 summary judgment standard when ruling on a motion to dismiss. 155 Citing its own case of Lawrence v. Dunbar,5 4 the Eleventh Circuit determined that an issue of material fact existed as to whether Hill
was injured in the scope of his employment and remanded the case for
factual findings. 5 5
C. Amending Judgments
In Nisson v. Lundy,' 66 the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's
finding that an untimely filed Motion to Amend a Judgment under Rule
146. 959 F.2d at 213.
147. Id. at 216.
148. Id. at 215-16.
149. 954 F.2d 694 (11th Cir. 1992) (opinion withdrawn and superseded in part on rehearing, 968 F.2d 1098 (l1th Cir. 1992)).
150. Id. at 697.
151. Id. at 695.
152. Id. at 696. The Federal Employees' Compensation Act ("FECA") requires that

Green
153.
154.
155.

exhaust his administrative remedies first.
Id. at 697-98.
919 F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1990).
954 F.2d at 698.

156. 975 F.2d 802 (11th Cir. 1992).
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52(b) 1 can be treated as a Rule 60(b)"' Motion for Relief from a Judgment. 159 Nisson was seeking relief from the court's determination of the
amount of lost profits awarded due to an alleged business interruption
caused by Lundy.16° Continuing the approach that Rule 60(b) is to be
given "liberal and remedial construction," the appellate court affirmed
the district court's decision to treat the untimely motion to amend as a
motion for relief from judgment."' The court held the language of Rule
60(b) encompasses "mistakes of fact as well as mistakes of law," notwithstanding the statement in Olivier v. Home Indemnity Co., 162 suggesting
that the rule is limited to mistakes of law.1 63 In the "interest of justice,"
however, the appellate court held that it was an abuse of discretion for
the trial judge to not grant plaintiff at least a hearing on his motion for a
partial new
trial to allow plaintiff to introduce new evidence about
6
damages. 1 4

In O'Neal v. Kennamer,16 the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district
court's denial of a Rule 59(e)"' Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment.161 In O'Neal insurers seeking subrogation were denied recovery 1of8
medical benefits, as Alabama law does not provide for such recovery. 6
While the motion to amend the judgment was timely filed within the ten
day prescribed time period, the court determined that the issue raised in
the motion, whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA") 169 preempted both Alabama and Tennessee law on recovery of
medical benefits, was not timely raised.170 In its affirmation of the district
court's denial of the motion, the Eleventh Circuit emphasized that the
motion to amend raised arguments that could, and should, have been
made before the original judgment was issued.173 The party seeking the
amendment gave no explanation for its failure
to address the issue earlier;
72
therefore, no amendment was authorized.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

FED, R. Civ. P. 52(b).
FE.M R. Civ. P. 60(b).
975 F.2d at 807.
Id. at 805.
Id. at 807.

162. 470 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1972).
163. 975 F.2d at 807.
164. Id.
165. 958 F.2d 1044 (11th Cir. 1992).

166. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
167: 958 F.2d at 1048.
168. Id. at 1046.
169. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
170. 958 F.2d at 1047.

171. Id.
172. Id.
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D. Opening Sealed Record
A significant case to keep in mind during settlement negotiations is
Brown v. Advantage Engineering, Inc.173 In Brown the Eleventh Circuit
allowed permissive intervention of an unrelated third party for the purposes of unsealing the trial court record.174 In a Georgia personal injury
case against Amoco Chemical ("Amoco"), defendant settled the case after
losing a summary judgment motion.' 7 One of the key provisions of the
settlement was an agreement to seal the record. 7 6 Westlands Water District ("Westlands") later sued an Amoco subsidiary in a different federal
district court on a different claim. To obtain documents from the Georgia
lawsuit bearing on an alleged common issue, Westlands filed a Rule 24(b)
motion for permissive intervention in the settled case contending that the
record contained admissions helpful to its case. Amoco argued there was
no longer a case in which to intervene and that the motion was untimely. 7 7" The district court denied the motion as untimely and as eliminating "a crucial benefit of the settlement." ' s The Eleventh Circuit held
that "it is immaterial whether the sealing of the record is an integral part
of a negotiated settlement between the parties," 17 ' because once the matter is brought before a court for resolution, as in Amoco's motion for summary judgment, the case is no longer the parties' case, but the public's
case.' 80 "Absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances set forth by the
district court in the record . . . the court file must remain accessible to
the public."' Since no extraordinary circumstances were enunciated by
the district court, the record was open for third party Westlands'
review. 182
VI. LOCAL RULES

A.

Consent Decrees

In Clark v. Housing Authority,1 83 the court held that the Southern District of Georgia's local rule requiring motions for attorney fees and costs
to be filed ten days prior to the time for filing a notice of appeal applied
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

960 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1016.
Id. at 1014.
Id. at 1016.
Id. at 1014-15.
Id. at 1015.
Id. at 1016.
Id.
Id.
Id.
971 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1992).
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to consent orders.'" Tenants of the Housing Authority failed to seek attorney fees within ten days of the date to appeal a consent order. While
the court recognized that all consent decrees are not appealable, to require a district court to "make a threshold determination whether a consent decree is appealable" would "undermine the goal of timeliness standards that local rules seek to establish."'" Therefore, all motions for
attorney fees based on consent decrees must be filed in a timely fashion
as required by the local rule.
B. Summary Judgment
In Brown v. Crawford County, Georgia,1" the Eleventh Circuit found
that the local procedure of two judges in the Middle District of Georgia
deprived litigants of their rights under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."" The Crawford County Commissioners alleged that they were not
allowed to file summary judgment motions because zoning determinations
made by the board receive legislative immunity. 88 While the Eleventh
Circuit recognized the rights of district courts to make and amend their
own rules governing practice under Rule 83,'1" these rules should be consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 90 The procedure of the
two judges was to prescreen motions for summary judgment to determine
their validity, viewing the motions before filing."" Defendants alleged
that the clerk's office in the Middle District of Georgia would not accept a
motion for summary judgment for filing unless a judge had approved it.
The Eleventh Circuit found this practice to be inconsistent with Rule
56,' a violation of the substantive and procedural rights of the litigating
parties, and ordered that the practice be ceased."'
VII. SANCTIONS

The Eleventh Circuit entertained an interesting case regarding the
award of attorney fees as sanctions in Aetna Insurance Co. v. Meeker.9
The attorney for an insured in that case appealed from an order accessing
184. Id. at 727; S.D. GA. R. 11.2(b).
185.

971 F.2d at 727.

186.
187.
188.
189.

960 F.2d 1002 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1013.
Id. at 1006-07.
FED. R. Civ. P. 83.

190.
191.
192.
193.

960 F.2d at 1008.
Id. at 1007-08.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
960 F.2d at 1009.

194. 953 F.2d 1328 (11th Cir. 1992).
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Rule 111' sanctions for pursuing unfounded counterclaims against Aetna.
Meeker had obtained a marine insurance policy from Aetna covering a
sailboat named Head First. When the boat sank less than three weeks
later, Meeker sought to collect for the loss under Aetna's policy. Aetna
immediately filed a declaratory judgment action against Meeker seeking
to determine if Meeker was the owner and if the loss was accidental.
Meeker filed counterclaims against Aetna alleging bad faith. Meeker was
subsequently indicted on two counts of mail fraud and one count of wire
fraud for his fraudulent attempt to obtain insurance proceeds for the
sinking of Head First. On November 18, a criminal matter was filed in
Florida charging Meeker with insurance fraud and possession of a vessel
with an altered identification.1 Aetna moved for summary judgment on
its declaratory judgment action and on Meeker's counterclaims. On November 15, 1988, Meeker filed a brief in opposition to Aetna's motion for
summary judgment, arguing that there was "'absolutely no evidence'"
for Aetna's claims that Meeker provided false information with respect to
his insurance application, that Meeker did not own Head First, or that
Head First was intentionally sunk.' 7 On March 22, 1989, Meeker pleaded
nolo contendre to the insurance fraud charges brought against him, and
on March 17, 1989, he was convicted of mail and wire fraud in federal
court. ' 8 The district court concluded that by the time Meeker's brief was
filed by his counsel, "it was impossible to continue to argue reasonably
that Aetna's denial of Meeker's insurance claim was in bad faith or even
unreasonable.'"" The court of appeals agreed that such a finding was
within the trial court's discretion.200 The award of attorney fees against
Meeker's counsel was limited to Aetna's expenses in defending the coun20
terclaim, not Aetna's cost of bringing the declaratory judgment action. '
Another interesting issue in this case is whether the district court erred
in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing and for failing to explicitly state
its findings of fact and conclusions of law when determining that Meeker
must pay attorney fees for a frivolous appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 38.202 The Eleventh Circuit had previously vacated a
district court's award of attorney fees in Marable v. Walker202 because
the district court had refused to hold a requested evidentiary hearing and
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201,
202.
203.

FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
953 F.2d at 1329-31.
Id. at 1330.
Id.
Id. at 1332.
Id.
Id. at 1334.
Id. at 1334-35; FED. R. App. P. 38.
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the basis of the award could not be clearly discerned from the record in
the trial court.2 " The Eleventh Circuit found this argument unpersuasive
in Meeker, however, as appellant did not even request an evidentiary
hearing and did not controvert Aetna's affidavit, which contained detailed
information concerning the amount and type of legal services provided by
Aetna's counsel. 0 5 The Eleventh Circuit, while not overruling the award
of attorney fees, did emphasize that "the best practice calls for a district
court to make explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law in supporting any Order setting attorney's fees." 06
VIII. CONCLUSION
A review of the Eleventh Circuit's 1992 decisions suggests that the
court has not reduced its willingness to affirm or assert federal jurisdiction over matters in litigation. It is also clear, as in the past, that trial
counsel must pay close attention to the applicable rules of procedure to
protect their client's interests. The 1992 survey again includes instances
when procedural missteps have been prejudicial to litigants.

204.
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953 F.2d at 1334.
Id. at 1335.
Id.

